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INTERACTION OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE
AND U.S. DOMESTIC SUGAR PRICE SUPPORT:
A POLITICAL CONTRADICTION
I. INTRODUCTION

President Reagan announced the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act'
(also referred to as the Caribbean Basin Initiative or "CBI") on February 24,
1982, as an incentive to help ameliorate severe economic difficulties and political unrest in Caribbean Basin countries. 2 CBI was introduced as an unprecedented program of trade development, economic assistance and tax measures intended
to promote economic growth in the Caribbean through inter-regional investment and trade . 3 One of the most attractive features of CBI from the perspective of many Caribbean nations is the duty-free4 treatment of sugar. I Sugar
exports constitute an important source of foreign exchange receipts for many
of these nations . 6 However, this provision of CBI is considerably weakened
by the Presidential enactment of safeguards designed to prevent injury to the
7
U.S. domestic sugar industry .
A U.S. sugar policy is diametrically opposed to the CBI program. The policy protects the domestic sugar industry by stabilizing sugar prices during periods of radical price fluctuation. 8 This policy resulted in severe curbs on U.S.
sugar imports from Caribbean nations during the two-year period after the 1983
enactment of CBI. 9 During this period total CBI sugar imports declined more
than forty percent, and the Caribbean nations' export earnings declined fortythree percent. '0 This import crisis has continued to worsen, as the 1988 sugar

1. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (Supp. V 1986).
2. Remarks on the Caribbean Basin Initiative to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, 1 (PUB. PAPERS) 210, 211 (Feb. 24, 1982) [hereinafter PUB. PAPERS].
3. U.S. AND FOREIGN COMMERCIAL SERV., INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1987
GUIDEBOOK CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE 1 (Oct. 1986) [hereinafter GUIDEBOOK].
4. A duty is a tax on imports. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 355 (1973).
5. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
6. Infra notes 34 and 35.

7. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(c)-(g) (Supp. IV 1986).
8. ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SUGAR BACKGROUND
LATION, AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION BULLETIN, No. 478, 1 (1984).

FOR 1985 FARM LEGIS-

9. Review of the Impact and Effectiveness of the CaribbeanBasin Initiative: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 163 (1986) (statement
of Thomas 0. Kay, Administrator Foreign Agric. Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric.).

10. Id.
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quota allocations for twelve CBI countries reached only 25 % of the 1983 sugar
quota allocations for the same countries. 11 As the export crisis for the Caribbean continues, the U.S. sugar industry is expanding production and achieving
higher prices.
II. PURPOSE

The objective of this comment is to examine the controversial role of sugar
export and import policies in the formation and progression of CBI. A brief
discussion of CBI in general is followed by an analysis of the U.S. sugar support
system and its part in CBrs development. The progress of CBI to date is reviewed
in conjunction with currently proposed amendments meant to alleviate problems
blamed on the U.S. sugar policy. Finally, a proposed system designed, to accommodate both the U.S. domestic sugar policy and CBI is presented.
A. The Caribbean Basin Initiative

1. Introduction
CBI's framework consists of rules for beneficiary country designations, 12 requirements for eligible products, 13 safeguards to protect U.S. domestic industries, 14 reporting procedures for periodic review of CBI's effect,1 5 and several
tax incentive measures. 16 The chief benefit of CBI is the elimination of duties
on eligible products 17 from Caribbean nations designated as beneficiary coun-

11. Calculations were based upon U.S. Sugar Import Charts appearing in: ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERV.,
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SUGAR AND SWEETENER SITUATION AND OUTLOOK YEARBOOK 31 (1986) & EcoNOMIC RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SUGAR AND SWEETENERS SITUATION AND OUTLOOK REPORT
13 (1988).
The twelve CBI countries included are Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, St. Christopher-Nevis and Trinidad-Tobago. Id.
12. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
13. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
14. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(c)-(f) (Supp. IV 1986).
15. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2704-2705 (Supp. IV 1986).
16. 26 U.S.C. § 274 (1982).
17. GUIDEBOOK, supra note 3, at 5.

Articles not eligible include: textiles and apparel subject to the Multifiber Agreement; canned tuna; petroleum
and petroleum products; footwear; certain leather, rubber and plastic gloves; luggage, handbags, and flat
goods; certain leather wearing apparel. Watches and watch parts being excluded if any material utilized in
their manufacture was derived from a communist country. Id.
At the time CBI was enacted, eighty-seven percent of Caribbean Basin products entered the U.S. duty
free; however, CRI provides for a wider variety of potential products. PUB. PAPERS, supra note 2, at 212.
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tries. 18 The President must consider six criteria in designating a country as a
beneficiary. 19 A country is ineligible for beneficiary status if the conditions of
any one of the criteria are met; 20 however, four of these criteria may be waived
by the President in order to promote a national economic or security interest
of the United States. 21 In addition to the mandatory conditions are eleven discretionary criteria the President must also consider in beneficiary designation. 22
Eligible products must meet "rules-of-origin" requirements which ensure that
all benefits are bestowed only upon beneficiary countries. 23 Five categories of
products are specifically excluded from CBI duty-free treatment. 24 Safeguards
are built into C1 to protect U.S. domestic industry, labor or agriculture from
injury generated by increased imports. 2r For example, the President is autho18. GUIDEBOOK, supra note 3, at 3-4.
19 U.S.C. § 2702(b)-(e) (Supp. IV 1986) sets forth the criteria to be considered by the President in designating a beneficiary country.
Presently, twenty-two countries are beneficiary countries including: Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Jamaica, Montserrat, Netherland Antilles, Panama, St. Christopher-Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago and the British Virgin Islands. GUIDEBOOK, supra note
3, at iv.
19. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
The President shall not designate any country a beneficiary country: (1) if such country is a communist
country; (2) if such country fails to meet certain criteria regarding expropriation of U.S. property; (3) if
such country fails to recognize as binding arbitral awards to U.S. citizens; (4) if such country provides preferential treatment to the products-of another developed country which adversely affects United States commerce;
(5) if such country engages in the broadcast of U.S. copyrighted material without the consent of the owner;
or (6) unless~such country has entered into an extradition treaty with the United States. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. The four criteria that may be waived by the President include: (1) if such country is a communist
country; (2) if such country fails to meet certain criteria regarding expropriation of U.S. property; (3) if
such country fails to recognize as binding arbitral awards to U.S. citizens; and (4) if such country engages
in the broadcast of U.S. copyrighted material without the consent of the owner. Id.
22. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c) (Supp. IV 1986).
The eleven discretionary criteria include: (1) an expression by such country of its desire to be designated;
(2) the economic conditions in such country; (3) the extent to which the country is prepared to provide equitable
and reasonable access to its markets and basic commodity resources; (4) the extent to which such country
adheres to the accepted rules of international trade; (5) the extent to which such country uses export subsidies, or imposes export performance requirements and local content requirements, which distort international trade; (6) the extent to which the trade policies of such country as they relate to other CBI countries are
contributing to the revitalization of the region; (7) the extent to which such country is undertaking self-help
measures to promote its own economic development; (8) the extent to which workers in such country are
afforded reasonable workplace conditions and enjoy the right to organize and bargain collectively; (9) the
extent to which such country protects the intellectual property rights, including patents and trademarks, of
foreign nationals; (10) the degree to which such country prohibits its nationals from engaging in the broadcast of copyrighted material belonging to U.S. copyright owners without their express consent; and (11)
the degree to which such country is prepared to cooperate with the United States in the administration of
the provisions of this chapter. Id.
23. GUIDEBOOK, supra note 3, at 5-6.
The rules-of-origin requirements include: (1) an article must be grown, produced, or manufactured in a
beneficiary country; (2) the cost or value of the article must consist of at least 35 % direct cost of processing
in one or more beneficiary countries (Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are included as beneficiary
countries for the purpose of determining this percentage, and U.S.-made components may comprise 15%
of the 35%); and (3) any product made with foreign materials must be substantially transformed (a new
and different article of commerce). Id.
24. Id. See also supra note 17.
25. GUIDEBOOK, supra note 3, at 6.
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rized to suspend CBI duty-free treatment with respect to any eligible article
and to establish a duty rate for the article 26 if injury or threat of injury to the
domestic industry results. 27 Such proclamations remain in effect until modified or terminated . 2 Also, the International Trade Commission 29 is required
to submit periodic reports to the President detailing the impact of CBI on U.S.
industries and consumers,3 0 and the Secretary of Labor is required to evaluate
the effects of CBI on U.S. labor. 31
In addition, CBI tax provisions allow tax deductions for business convention
expenses incurred by Americans in a beneficiary country on the condition that
the beneficiary country exchanges tax information with the U.S. 32 Expiration
of CBI's twelve-year term is set for September 30, 1995.33
2. The Caribbean Basin's Sugar Dependence and CBI Safeguard Provisions
Achieving a balance between the importance of U.S. sugar supports to the
domestic economy and the dependency on sugar exports of many Caribbean
nations required much debate. Historically, the economies of many Caribbean
nations have been profoundly dependent on sugar. I In 1986 alone, sugar ex-

26. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
27. GUIDEBOOK, supra note 3, at 6 (Oct. 1986).
28. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(e)(5)(A) (Supp.IV 1986).
29. The United States International Trade Commission ("the Commission") is composed of six members
who are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1982).
The Commission has a duty to investigate and report matters concerning the customs laws of the United
States. 19 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1982). The Commission is authorized to adopt such rules and regulations necessary
to carry out its duties. 19 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982). In addition, the Commission has the duty to investigate
unfair trade practices and to determine if a violation of such practices has occurred. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)-(c)
(Supp. IV 1986). To expedite its investigations, the Commission can conduct preliminary investigations and
determine the scope and manner of its proceedings. 19 U.S.C. § 2482(a) (1982).
30. 19 U.S.C. § 2704 (Supp. IV 1986).
31. 19 U.S.C. § 2705 (Supp. IV 1986).
32. GUtIOEOOK, supra note 3, at 6-7.
33. 19 U.S.C. § 2706 (Supp. IV 1986). Also included in CBI are special provisions to benefit Puerto
Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. GUIDEBOOK, supra note 3, at 6-7. See Foote, The CaribbeanBasin Initiative: Development, Implementation and Application of the Rules of Origin and Related Aspects Duty-Free
Treatment, 19 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 245 (1985) for an excellent discussion of the rules and
specifications of CBI.
34. Caribbeanand Central America: Joint HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs
of the Comm. on ForeignAffairs and the Subconmm. on Department Operations,Research and ForeignAgriculture of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 97-98 (1982) (statement of Robert A. Pastor,
School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland).
Caribbean Basin Dependence on Sugar, Selected Countries, 1980.
Sugar Shipped to U.S.
as % of all Exports
to U.S.
Dominican Republic
52
Panama
35
Guatemala
29
Barbados
42
Costa Rica
13.4
Belize
65
Id. at 103.

Total Sugar Exports
as a % of total
Exports
32.5
15.9
4.5
24.4
4.0
37.8
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ports accounted for sixty-five percent of St. Kitts' and thirty-five percent of the
Dominican Republic's foreign exchange receipts. 3 5 During the development of
CBI, however, special rules limiting the amount of a beneficiary country's sugar
that would be eligible for duty-free status, were adopted to provide protection
for the U.S. sugar producers. 36 All beneficiary countries, with the exception
of the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Panama, are allowed duty-free treatment for sugar.3 7 However, the President may suspend or expand this treatment in accordance with its effect on the U.S. price support system. 38 The
President has exercised his authority by reducing the 1988 sugar quota allocations for twelve CB1 countries to a level equal to only 25 % of the 1983 quota
allocations for the same countries..3 Such action has caused significant injury
to the economies of these countries. The Dominican Republic, Guatemala and
Panama are allowed statutory quotas of sugar exports to the U.S., based upon
one hundred ten percent of each country's exports to the U.S. in the three years
prior to 1983.40 However, because of the Presidential imposition of sugar quota
allocations since CBrs enactment, these countries have consistently experienced
quotas less than those provided for by statute. 1 Further protective measures
for the U.S. price support authorize the President, upon the Secretary of Agriculture's recommendation, to suspend duty-free treatment of all or a portion of
'the quantity of sugar permitted to enter the U.S. 2 This power waits in the wings
of the Caribbean economic scene as an indication of the limitations imposed
on the success of programs such as CBI due to U.S. self-protectionist fears.

35. Review of the Impact and Effectiveness of the CaribbeanBasin Initiative: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comn. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 346, 1059 (1986) (statement
of Ambassador Eulegio Santaella of the Dominican Republic and Erstein M. Edwards, Deputy Chief of Mission,
St. Christopher (St. Kitts) and Nevis).
36. Foote, supra note 33, at 294-95.
37. Id. This treatment is consistent with the Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP") provisions. Id.
GSP allows over 2800 products from developing countries all over the world to enter the U.S. duty-free.
The program will be in effect at least through 1993. GSP differs from CBI in various ways. GSP's scope
is worldwide, while CBI focuses upon the Caribbean Basin. The product coverage of GSP is not as expansive as CBrs. Currently, GSP's planned period of operation is two years shorter then CBrs (with CBI not
expiring until 1995). GSP requires that all 35% of added value come from one beneficiary country, while
CRI allows value from several countries to be accumulated in reaching the 35 % level. Additionally, CBI
allows 15% of the value to be from U.S. source materials, and value added in U.S. insular possessions may
account for beneficiary country input. GUIDEBOOK, supra note 3, at 7-8.
38. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(e)(4) (Supp. IV 1986).
39. See supra note 11.
40. Foote, supra note 33, at 295. Dominican Republic - 780,000 metric tons; Guatemala - 210,000 metric tons; Panama - 160,000 metric tons. Id.

41.

ECONomic RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRic., SUGAR AND SWEETENER SITUATION AND OUT31 (1986), ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SUGAR AND SWEETENERS

LOOK YEARBOOK

SITUATION AND OUTLOOK REPORT

13 (1988).

42. Foote, supra note 33, at 296-97.
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B. The U.S. Domestic Sugar Policy
Sugar has long been subject to a variety of fees and quotas, and to a complex
price support system imposed by the U.S. Prior to 1977, the U.S. government supported the domestic sugar industry by imposing tariffs and quotas on
imports. 44 A plan of loans and purchases was instituted on September 29, 1977,
("the Agriculture Act of 1977") which provided that the 1977 and 1978 crops
of sugar beets and sugar cane would be supported at a level between 52.5 %
and 65 %of parity, 4 but in no event was that level to result in a price less than
thirteen and one-half cents per pound for raw sugar. 4 Loans at this level were
effected by the pledging of sugar as collateral for a Commodity Credit Corporation loan. The Agriculture Act of 1977 further instructed the Secretary of
Agriculture to establish minimum wage rates for agricultural employees engaged in the production of sugar. 47 This loan-subsidy program continued to
exist through the 1979 crop year. 4 With no support system available for sugar
producers, prices fluctuated from less than twenty cents per pound to above
forty cents per pound. 4
On October 1, 1982, the government introduced a sugar industry support program which authorized commodity loans for domestically produced sugar for
the 1982 through 1985 crop years (the "Food Act of 1981"). 50 The Food Act
of 1981 provided for a non-recourse loan program, initially setting the loan
rate at seventeen cents per pound, and elevating that rate to eighteen and threequarter cents for the 1985 crop year. 51 Sugar was to be pledged as collateral
43. ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SUGAR BACKGROUND FOR 1985 FARM LEGISLATION, AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION BULLETIN, No. 478, iii (1984).
44. H.R. REP. No. 271, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 202, reprintedin 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1660, 1868.

45. Parity is defined as a level for farm-product prices maintained by governmental support and intended to give farmers the same purchasing power they had during a chosen base period. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 953 (1979).

46. H.R. REP. No. 271, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 203, reprintedin 1985 U.S. CODE CONG.

&

ADMIN. NEWS 1660, 1869.

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. H.R. REP. No. 271, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 11, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG.
ADMIN. NEWS 1103, 1115.
50. H.R. REP. No. 271, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 203, reprintedin 1985 U.S. CODE CONG.

&
&

ADMIN. NEWS 1660, 1869.

"During the short period between enactment of the law and the availability of the loans, the U.S. Department of Agriculture was directed to operate a 'direct purchase program' providing sugar producers the alternative of selling sugar to the government for 16.75 cents per pound if they could not get more in the market
place." Id.
In opening remarks before the Subcommittee on Cotton, Rice and Sugar on March 17, 1981, Mississippi
Representative David R. Bowen stated that "[tihe United States is the only sugar producing nation in the
world which has no sugar program of any kind, no farm program, no protection of any kind." GeneralFarm
Bill
of 1981 (Cotton, Rice, and Sugar Program):HearingsBefore the Subconmm. on Cotton, Rice, and Sugar
of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1981) (statement of David R. Bowen, Congressional Representative from Mississippi).
51. H.R. REP. No. 271, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 12, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1103, 1115.
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and Senate Agriculture Committees prior to any public announcement of the
loan rate. 63
C. Debates Over CBI's Adoption Involving Sugar
Realizing the critical dependence of CBI nation economies on sugar exportation, much debate over CBI provisions during the creation of the program
centered upon the U.S. sugar price support policy. These debates resulted in
three diverse views on the question of CBI's enactment, one in opposition and
two in favor of the program. Daniel K. Akaka, Congressional Representative
from Hawaii, was vehemently opposed to the CBI program due to the conceivably detrimental effect which increased duty-free sugar imports would have on
the domestic sugar market. " Richard A. Smith, Administrator of the Foreign
Agricultural Service, stressed the need for assistance to the Basin nations and
emphasized the adequacy of safeguard provisions within CB1 to protect the U.S.
sugar policy. 65 Robert A. Pastor, a second proponent, asserted that the very
existence of a U.S. sugar policy negated any benefit CBI could potentially provide because of the limitations on sugar imports to the U.S."
Those in favor of CBI urged a need for a broad restructuring and diversification of Basin economies in addition to agricultural revitalization. 67 The many
difficult aspects of diversification faced by countries which predominantly
produce sugar, namely the Dominican Republic and Barbados, were compounded
by their soil's unsuitableness for any other crop. 6 Because agriculture was totally
neglected in CBI, it was predicted that the number of agricultural jobs lost through

63. Id.
64. CaribbeanBasin Initiative: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 384 (1982) (statement of Daniel K. Akaka, Congressional Representative
from Hawaii).
65. CaribbeanBasin Initiative: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1982) (statement of Richard A. Smith, Administrator, Foreign Agric.
Serv., Dep't of Agric.).
66. Caribbean and Central America: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs
of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the Subcomm. on DepartmentOperations, Research andForeign Agriculture of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1982) (statement of Robert A. Pastor,
School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland).
67. Caribbeanand Central America: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs
of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the Subcomm. on DepartmentOperations,Research and ForeignAgriculture of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1982) (statement of Sally A. Shelton,
Vice President, International Business-Government Counsellors, Inc.).
68. Id. It was stated that sugar cane produces ten times the income and employment that could be achieved
from the use of the land in cattle production. CaribbeanBasin Initiative: HearingsBefore the Subcomm.
on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 482 (1982) (statement of Felipe
J. Vicini, Chairman, Vicini Group of Sugar Manufacturing Companies). But see CaribbeanBasin Initiative:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
430 (1982) (statement of Cecil Heftel, Congressional Representative from Hawaii) (In opposing CBI, Mr.
Heftel stated that the soil of Hawaii had similar characteristics to that of the Caribbean in that no alternate
crop or use could be found to replace sugar).
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the program would be twice the number of manufacturing jobs generated. 69
Also, the encouragement of assembly operations in which firms would import
virtually all raw materials from the U.S. and export all products to the U.S.
70
would create no incentive to link these firms to the local Basin communities.
The importance of sugar to the Caribbean was demonstrated by the fact that
sugar exports from these countries were valued at over one billion dollars in
1981, with sixty percent of that total entering the U.S. 71 Several proponents
of CBI expressed concern that the Food Act of 1981 would eliminate much of
the accruing benefit to most Caribbean sugar producers through CBI. 72 Predictions estimated that the volume of sugar exported from the Caribbean Basin
would decrease from 1.3 million metric tons in 1981 to less than 1.1 million
metric tons in 1982 due to the constriction of sugar quotas. 73 The significant
impact of sugar quotas on the Dominican Republic was especially revealing,
because the Dominican Republic had been the leading and most stable supplier
of sugar to the U.S. for the twenty years prior to 1982.71 Statistics document
that the Dominican Republic relied on the sugar industry as its largest employer and as its main source of export earnings, comprising one-third of these earnings in 1980 and one-half in 1981 .7 Ninety-eight percent of the Dominican
Republic's sugar had traditionally been exported to the U.S., and in 1982 alone

69. Caribbean and Central America: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs
of the Comm. on ForeignAffairs and the Subcomm. on Department Operations, Researchand ForeignAgriculture of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1982) (statement of Robert A. Pastor,
School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland).
70. Id.
71. Review of CBI Sugar Provisions:Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Cotton, Rice, and Sugar of the
House Comm. on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1982) (statement of Donald M. Nelson, Assistant
U.S. Trade Representative for Agricultural Affairs and Commodity Policy).
72. Caribbeanand Central America: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs
of the Comm. on ForeignAffairs and the Subcomm. on Department Operations,Research and ForeignAgriculture of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982) (statement of Sally A. Shelton,
Vice President, International Business Government Counsellors, Inc.).
73. Caribbeanand Central America: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs
of the Comm. on ForeignAffairs and the Subcomm. on Department Operations,Research and ForeignAgriculture of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1982) (statement of Robert A. Pastor,
School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland).
Actual U.S. sugar imports from Caribbean Basin nations under quotas for the period from October 1,
1982 through September 25, 1983 were 1.08 million metric tons. ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEPT
OF AGRIC., SUGAR AND SWEETENER SITUATION AND OUTLOOK YEARBOOK 31 (1986).
74. CaribbeanBasin Initiative: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 482 (1982) (statement of Felipe J. Vicini, Chairman, Vicini Group of
Sugar Manufacturing Companies).
75. Caribbeanand Central America: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs
ofthe Comm. on ForeignAffairs and the Subcomm. on Department Operations,Research and ForeignAgriculture of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1982) (statement of Robert A. Pastor,
School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland).
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for a Commodity Credit Corporation loan, with interest calculated at a rate which
covered the government's cost of money. 52 All loans were to have terms of six
months, provided however, that a loan term could not extend beyond the fiscal
year in which the loan was made. 53 Congress' main objective was to coordinate
the program in such a fashion that no sugar would be forfeited to the Commodity Credit Corporation. 54 To achieve this purpose, Congress directed the
Department of Agriculture to establish a market stabilization price (MSP) considered to be the minimum market price at which sugar sales would be encouraged
and sugar forfeitures would be discouraged. 5 The MSP was to be maintained
through a system of import duties, fees, and quotas established by Presidential
proclamations. 56 Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, as
amended, authorized special import fees or quotas on foreign commodity imports contingent upon a determination that the imports are potentially injurious
57
to the successful maintenance of the domestic price support system.
The sugar loan program enacted in 1981 was extended for each of the 1986
through 1990 crops of sugar beets and sugar cane ("the Food Security Act of
1985") at a level of eighteen cents per pound. 5 In stressing the need for the
continuation of a domestic sugar program, the congressional committees pointed
to the wide price fluctuations triggered by the volatile world sugar market.5 9
The committees stated that approximately sixty percent of exported sugar was
traded under preferential arrangements, leaving a small residual amount for the
world sugar market. 60 These fluctuating amounts of exported sugar dumped into
the world market have created patterns of overproduction, followed by cutbacks
in production resulting finally in cycles of plummeting, succeeded by spiraling, prices.61
Additional provisions of the Food Security Act of 1985 direct the Secretary
of Agriculture to adjust the annual loan rate upon consideration of inflation,
costs of production and other circumstances adversely affecting domestic sugar
production. 62 In the event the Secretary does not make such adjustments, he
is directed to submit such findings, decisions and supporting data to the House

52. H.R. REP. No. 271, 99th Cong.,
NEWS 1660, 1870.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. H.R. REP. No. 271, 99th Cong.,
ADMIN. NEWS 1103, 1115.
57. H.R. REP. No. 271, 99th Cong.,
ADMIN. NEWS 1660, 1870.
58. 7 U.S.C. § 14460)(1) (Supp. IV
59. H.R. REP. No. 271, 99th Cong.,
ADMIN. NEWS 1103, 1116.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. H.R. REP. No. 271, 99th Cong.,
ADMIN. NEWS 1103, 1118.

1stSess., pt. 2, at 204, reprinted in 1985 U.S.

CODE CONG. &

1st Sess., pt. 1, at 12, reprinted in 1985 U.S.

CODE CONG. &

1st Sess., pt. 2, at 204, reprinted in 1985 U.S.

CODE CONG. &

1986).
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 12, reprinted in 1985 U.S.

CODE CONG. &

1st Sess., pt. 1, at 14, reprinted in 1985 U.S.

CODE CONG. &

ADMIN.
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the U.S. sugar program was predicted to preclude one-third of such sugar
76
exports.
Estimates were presented to demonstrate the impact of expected sugar quotas
on other CBI nations, for example: Honduras sugar exports were predicted to
77
decrease from eighty thousand tons in 1981 to fifty thousand tons in 1982,
and Belize sugar exports to the U.S. were expected to decrease ten thousand
tons (one-third of its capacity) from 1981 to 1982.78
Supporters of CBI argued that if these Caribbean countries were to go bankrupt
economically or politically, the costs would be more to the U.S. as a nation
than if U.S. sugar beet and cane farmers filed bankruptcy. 79 This political motivation for CBI was evident in a message delivered by Secretary of State George
Schultz:
Nearly half our trade, three-quarters of our imported oil, and over half
our imported strategic minerals pass through the Panama Canal or the Gulf
of Mexico. If this region should become prey to social and economic upheaval, and dominated by regimes hostile to us, the consequences for our
security would be immediate and far reaching. 0

76. Id.
Actual U.S. sugar imports from the Dominican Republic for the period from October 1, 1982 to September 25, 1983 were 507,423 tons resulting in a 24% decline from the Dominican Republic's 1981 sugar exports to the U.S. ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DE&'T OF AGRIc., SUGAR AND SWEETENER SITUATION
AND OUTLOOK YEARBOOK 31 (1986) and Caribbean and Central America: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the Subcomm. on Department Operatons, Research and Foreign Agriculture of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 104 (1982)
(Table 3. The Impact of the U.S. Sugar Quota Program on the Caribbean Basin, 1980).
77. Caribbean and Central America: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs
of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the Subcomm. on Department Operations, Research and Foreign Agriculture of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1982) (statement of Robert A. Pastor,
School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland).
Honduras' actual sugar exports to the U.S. for the period from October 1, 1982 to September 25, 1983
were 28,000 tons. ECONOmIC RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SUGAR AND SWEETENER SITUATION
AND OUTLOOK YEARBOOK 31 (1986). Caribbean and Central America: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Inter-American Affairs of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the Subcomm. on Department Operations,
Research and Foreign Agriculture of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 104 (1982)
(Table 3. The Impact of the U.S. Sugar Quota on the Caribbean Basin, 1980).
78. Caribbean and Central America: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs
of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the Subcomm. on Department Operations,Research and Foreign Agriculture of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1982) (statement of Robert A. Pastor,
School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland).
Belize's actual sugar exports to the U.S. for the period from October 1, 1982 through September 25, 1983
were 31,378 tons reflecting a decrease of over 11,000 tons from 1981. EcONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., SUGAR AND SWEETENER SITUATION AND OUTLOOK YEARBOOK 31 (1986) and Caribbean

and Central America: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the Subcomm. on Department Operations, Research and Foreign Agriculture of the House
Comm. on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 104 (1982) (Table 3. The Impact of the U.S. Sugar Quota
Program on the Caribbean Basin, 1980).
79. Caribbean and Central America: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs
of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the Subcomm. on Department Operations, Research and Foreign Agriculture of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1982) (statement of Robert A. Pastor,
School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland).
80. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CARIBBEAN BASIN ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT

(April 13, 1983) (statement by Secretary Schultz before the Senate Fin. Comm.).
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Objectors of CBI stated that the Food Act of 198 I's seventeen cent per pound
loan program for the 1982 sugar crop would only provide protection for sugar
producers against catastrophic losses, since the average cost of production per
pound for sugar cane at that time exceeded twenty-two and one-half cents. 81
They noted that total sugar import needs declined in 1982 and that duty-free
sugar imports would increase under CBI. Because the U.S. domestic price for
sugar is protected through duties and fees on imported sugar, as the volume
of duty sugar imports declines and the volume of duty-free sugar imports
increases, a point would be reached at which the domestic sugar price would
no longer have the fee and duty protection. 81 The ultimate end would be government purchases of sugar, the precise result the Food Act of 1981 was designed
to eliminate. 83 Another suggested result was that the additional quantity of sugar
that would be available for duty-free status under CBI could force the
administration to expand and increase its fee structure, causing higher import
fees to be paid by all producers (including CBI sugar producers). 84 This series
of hypothetical events suggests that CBI could be self-defeating or could exert
a negative impact on the Basin economies. 85 Also, duties and fees tend to depress
the world market price of sugar causing a spiraling effect; i.e., if higher fees
were required under CBI, the world price of sugar would decline resulting in
86
still higher fees.
Several CBI opponents suggested a rebate approach similar to that involving
the excise tax on rum rebated to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 8
This rebate program would impose duties on sugar from a beneficiary with the
duty collected being rebated to the government of the beneficiary country. 8
Proposed benefits of this program included: (1) the bestowal of money on those
who needed it (not the multi-national corporations that owned the sugar industry); (2) the support of CBI's objective of diversification away from sugar; 89
(3) the provision of more governmental control over economic development;

81. Caribbean Basin Initiative: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 383-84 (1982) (statement of Daniel K. Akaka, Congressional Representative from Hawaii).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Caribbean Basin Initiative: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 472-73 (1982) (statement of Nicholas Kominus, President, United States
Cane Sugar Refiners' Association).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
The rebate to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands of excise taxes collected by the U.S. on rum imported from these two Islands was adopted to protect their rum economies from declines caused by the duty
free treatment of rum under CBI. See I.R.C. § 7652(a)(3) & (b) (1982).
88. Caribbean Basin Initiative: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 384-85 (1982) (statement of Daniel K. Akaka, Congressional Representative from Hawaii).
89. Id.
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(4) the insurance of the full benefit of duty-free status; (5) the lessening of the
need for higher import fees on sugar; (6) the reduction of U.S. government
sugar acquisitions through loan forfeitures; and (7) the reduction of the need
for the U.S. government to engage in even more restrictive programs on imported
sugar to protect the price support. 90
Congress rejected the rebate approach because of the possibility that beneficiary
governments would encourage sugar production. 91 The primary objective of
CBI was to diversify beneficiary economies into nontraditional areas. Additionally, the rebate approach was not adopted because it would require maintaining an itemized summary of expenditures, and the Treasury was reluctant
92
to specifically mark funds.
The transshipment of sugar from a non-beneficiary country to a beneficiary
where it could be sold to the U.S. duty free was another area of debate. 93 The
committee was assured that this practice amounted to customs fraud and that
no one could continue to practice fraud on the custom service successfully. 91
Congress resolved these debates by enacting sugar provisions of CBI to provide for duty-free treatment of sugar from all CBI nations except for the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Panama. 91 These three countries are allowed
specified quotas of sugar exports. 96 Congress considered the safeguard provisions, which allow the President to suspend duty-free treatment on sugar, adequate to protect the U.S. domestic sugar industry.
Since the enactment of CB1, the President has continuously exercised his
authority to protect the domestic sugar industry. Such actions have resulted in
drastic reductions in the sugar quota allocations for all CB1 nations. 97
D. Review of CBI's Impact and Effectiveness
In February, 1986, congressional subcommittees conducted a series of hearings
in which they reviewed the impact and effectiveness of CBI. The topic capturing most of the attention at the hearings was a more than forty percent decline
in U.S. sugar imports since 1984 from the Caribbean countries which had su-

90. CaribbeanBasin Initiative:Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 471-72 (1982) (statement of Nicholas Kominus, President, United States
Cane Sugar Refiners' Association).
91. Id. at 481.
92. Id.
93. CaribbeanBasin Initiative: Hearingsand Markup Before the House Comm. on ForeignAffairs and
Its Subcomm. on Intl Economic Policy and Trade and on Inter-American Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 131
(1982) (statement of Tom Greer, Commodity/Industry Analyst, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n).
94. Id. A more realistic problem suggested would be in a situation where a beneficiary exported all
of its sugar to the U.S. and supplied its domestic needs with nonbeneficiary sugar. Historically, if a country's exports were above imports, its quota was usually cut. Id.
95. Foote, supra note 33, at 245.
96. Id.
97. EcONOMIc RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SUGAR AND SWEETENER SITUATION AND OUTLOOK YEARBOOK 31 (1986), ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T. OF AGRIC., SUGAR AND SWEETENERS
SITUATION AND OUTLOOK REPORT 13 (1988).
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gar import quotas. 98 As of 1986, this decline in U.S. sugar imports had resulted in a corresponding decline of one hundred seventy-five million dollars or
forty-three percent in export earnings of these Caribbean nations. 99
The Ambassador from Barbados, Peter Laurie, reported that since its initiation,
CBI had exercised only a marginal impact on that country's economy. 100 Exports from Barbados to the U.S. in 1985 declined by fifty percent compared
to 1984 levels. 101 The abandonment of operations by sixteen companies resulted
in the termination of seventeen hundred jobs in 1985 alone. 10 2 Unemployment
rose by five percent in the period from 1983 to 1985, resulting in an eventual
twenty percent unemployment rate. 103
104
Ambassador Laurie identified several reasons for CBI's ineffectiveness.
First, products in which Caribbean economies had the best potential for immediate growth, such as garments, had been excluded from the eligible articles
list.' 0 5 Increased quota limitations had been placed on sugar. This frustrated
the principle that economic growth and stability had to depend primarily on
continued reliance on traditional commodities. 10 6 Second, Caribbean entrepreneurs had experienced difficulty in successfully penetrating the U.S. market. 10 7 The need to comply with the complex regulatory requirements of the
U.S. market had exacerbated this problem. 108 Finally, [due to the lack of
investment incentives in CBI and the absence of knowledge on the part of U.S.
investors], new American investment had not materialized in sufficiently large
amounts. 109

Barbados made earnest attempts to promote the success of CBI. The government encouraged foreign private investment by adopting policies guaranteeing
investment security. 110 Barbados also entered a tax treaty and a Tax Informa-

98. Review of the Impact and Effectiveness of the Caribbean Basin Initiative: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 168 (1986) (statement
of Thomas 0. Kay, Administrator, Foreign Agricultural Service).
The countries included in the foregoing analysis are Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, St. Christopher-Nevis, and Trinidad and
Tobago. Id.
99. Id.
100. Review of the Impact and Effectiveness of the CaribbeanBasin Initiative: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 304 (1986) (statement
of his Excellency Peter Laurie, Ambassador of Barbados).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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tion Exchange Agreement with the U.S. to promote the tax incentive of convention benefits. 11 '
Suggestions proposed by Ambassador Laurie to enhance CBI included: (1)
revision of the CBI sugar import quotas to 1984 levels; (2) exemption for textile
products; (3) implementation of provisions to permit twin plants; (4) technical
assistance to strengthen management, marketing and institutional capacity of
Caribbean Basin governments; (5) exporter education in U.S. regulatory
requirements; (6) investigation and implementation of ways of lowering the
freight rates in the Caribbean; and (7) the allowance of marketing expenses of
Caribbean businesses to be counted toward the thirty-five percent rules-of-origin
2
requirement. 11
St. Lucia's Ambassador, Dr. Joseph E. Edmunds, reported that CBI was so
uniformly applied that it was injurious to less developed microisland states such
as St. Lucia. 113 He recommended that provisions be implemented to specifically focus upon countries of St. Lucia's size. " Ambassador Edmunds stated that
St. Lucia could never pose a threat to the U.S. economy; therefore, items should
be included on the CRI eligible articles lists which could positively impact the
Caribbean Basin economies.1 1 s
A report was also presented by Ambassador Eulegio Santaella of the Dominican
Republic, which is the largest of the Caribbean Islands. 116 Ambassador Santaella
noted that the decline in exports of sugar had been an obstacle to CBI's
progress. '1 7 While the Dominican Republic had made significant efforts to diversify its economy, sugar revenues constituted the primary source of finance for
business growth. " 8 With increased U.S. restrictions on sugar imports from the
Dominican Republic, most hope for business growth had been quashed. 19 Sugar
exports provided thirty-five percent of the nation's foreign exchange receipts,
120
making those receipts essential in obtaining imported products.
The Dominican government had entered into ventures to promote diversification into new industries. 121 Sugar cane land was being utilized for citrus,
pineapple and African palm projects. 1 Tourism had opened new areas of diver111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Review of the Impact and Effectiveness of the CaribbeanBasin Initiative: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Oversightof the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 328 (1986) (statement
of his Excellency Dr. Joseph E. Edmunds, Ambassador of St. Lucia).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Review of the Impact and Effectiveness of the CaribbeanBasin Initiative: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Oversightof the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 343 (1986) (statement
of Ambassador Eulegio Santaella of the Dominican Republic).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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sification with an expansion from ninety thousand visitors in 1970 to eight
hundred thousand in 1985. 123
Although the Dominican Republic had obtained higher prices on its sugar
sales to the U.S. as a result of the quota and CBI duty suspension, this higher
price advantage had been displaced significantly by the decrease in sugar volume.
The Dominican Republic's sugar volume had decreased from four hundred ninetythree thousand short tons in 1983 to two hundred ninety thousand short tons
in 1985.124 1986 was expected to bring a further twenty-five percent quota
25
reduction. 1
Ambassador Santaella explained that diversification was an evolutionary
process which made it necessary for the government to balance the loss in foreign exchange earnings and jobs against long-term advantages. 126 A suggested
solution for the sugar dilemma was to permit CBI sugar producers to27export
raw sugar refined into liquid sugar for the industrial syrup market. 1
A letter to Secretary of State George Schultz from the Ambassadors of the
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Panama and St. Christopher-Nevis dated July
10, 1985, emphasized the importance of allowing no further reductions in sugar
quotas and of creating a compensatory quota. 12 This compensatory quota would
permit exporting to the U.S. of raw sugar converted into liquid sugar. 129 The
outline of the proposed plan to alleviate the sugar quota reduction crisis included:
(1) overall import quotas to be set for CBI nations at a level equal to one hundred
five percent of traditional export volumes; and (2) sugar exportation categories
as follows: (a) raw sugar in accordance with regulations of the Department of
Agriculture; and (b) the balance for refining into sugar syrup. 130 It was emphasized that this proposal would frustrate neither prices received by U.S. cane
or beet farmers nor the U.S. price support system. 131
St. Kitts reported that the base of its economy was being eroded by sugar
quota reductions. 132 With forty-five percent of its population employed in the
sugar industry and sixty-five percent of its foreign exchange coming from sugar
exports, continued quota reductions would devastate its economy. 11 Total returns
from sugar exports for the period from January to August of 1984, as compared to those from January to August of 1985, evidenced a net loss of two
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Review of the Impact and Effectiveness of the CaribbeanBasin Initiative: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Oversightof the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1059 (1986) (statement
of Erstein M. Edwards, Deputy Chief of Mission, St. Christopher (St. Kitts) and Nevis).
133. Id.
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and one-half million dollars. This is quite a loss for a country of one hundred
four square miles and a population of forty-four thousand. 134
In January, 1987, a second impact study was conducted by a congressional
delegation from the Committee on Ways and Means involving visits to five countries in the Caribbean and Central America regions. 135 The primary concerns
and recommendations of the five countries concerning CBI included: the impact of the reduction in sugar quotas, U.S. protectionism and the fear of further legislative action, inability to penetrate U.S. markets, extending CBI for
twelve years, and expanding product coverage. 136 Positive results were noted
on CBI's effect in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic has developed new industries through its effort to take advantage of CBI, resulting in
a seventy percent increase of nontraditional exports from 1983 to 1986.137 Loss
of jobs in the sugar industry because of quota reductions more than counteracted with the gain of jobs in new industries. 13
In an attempt to accommodate the needs of the Caribbean Basin countries
and to improve the effectiveness of CBI, new CBI legislation was introduced
on August 5, 1987.
III. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS - THE CARIBBEAN BASIN
ECONOMIC RECOVERY EXPANSION ACT OF 1987

The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Expansion Act of 1987 ("CB II")
was announced by Rep. Sam M. Gibbons, Chairman of the Ways and Means
Trade Subcommittee, on August 5, 1987, with key provisions designed to: (1)
restore sugar quotas of Caribbean nations to the original levels which prevailed
when CBI took effect on January 1, 1984; (2) allow unlimited duty-free treatment for articles manufactured, assembled, or processed from materials, components and other products that are one hundred percent U.S. made (would allow
CBI garments wholly of U.S. textiles to enter the U.S. both duty and quota
free); (3) change the value-added requirement for duty-free imports from small
island nations of the eastern Caribbean, permitting increases from 15 % to 25 %
in the value of U.S. components which may be counted toward the 35 % minimum value-added requirement; (4) allow limited duty-free treatment for articles exempt under current law, provided that the International Trade Commission
issues a finding and the President determines that the articles are either not
produced in the U.S. or are in short supply; (5) create a "tariff-rate quota"

134. Id.at 1062.
135. SUBCOMM. ON

OVERSIGHT OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
100TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON THE COMM. DELEGATION MISSION TO THE CARIBBEAN BASIN AND
RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE 7

1987).
136. Id.at 12.
137. Id.at 23.
138. Id.at 24.

(Comm. Print
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allowing a specific volume of goods in each product category that are currently
taxable under CBI to enter duty-free; (6) extend duty-free treatment for eligible imports for an additional twelve years - from September 30, 1995 through
September 30, 2007; (7) increase the duty-free allowance for U.S. citizens returning from CBI beneficiary countries and U.S. insular possessions by $200 (on
return from a CBI beneficiary, the exemption would be $600, while on return
from a U.S. insular possession the exemption would be $1000); (8) require a
separate injury determination for CBI beneficiary nations in countervailing duty
and anti-dumping cases (this would cumulate imports from CBI countries as
a group in determining whether an unfair trade practice causes material injury
to a U.S. domestic industry); and (9) permit duty-free entry until December
31, 1988, of ethanol, which is dehydrated by certain facilities in Costa Rica
and Jamaica. 139
Proponents for the new CB II bill stress the fact that two thirds of Caribbean
sugar sales to the U.S. were lost after CBI became law. 140 Although there is
support for the new bill, a strong lobby is predicted to quash all hope for
restoration of Caribbean sugar quotas. 14 1 Critics of the bill attack the lack of
provisions addressing the dilemma of a developing country's immediate need
of the basic facilities, equipment, services and installations necessary for the
42
country's growth and global economic participation. 1
IV.

OUTLOOK

A. Considerations
Predictions which estimated losses to the Caribbean nations because of the
U.S. sugar policy have been extremely accurate. ' As sugar quota allocations
rapidly decline, Caribbean nations will continue to experience severe economic disruption. Diversification of the Caribbean economies away from sugar will
require a long-term plan. It is apparent that a short-term plan is untenable.
Several elements must be evaluated in order to place CBI's interaction with
a proposed sugar stabilization bill into proper prospective. Elements to consider include the prosperity of the U.S. sugar market, drastic sugar quota allocation declines, the high fructose corn syrup ("HFCS") share of the U.S.
sweetener market, and the elements previously submitted in support of the sugar
stabilization bill.
The U.S. domestic sugar industry is prospering. Estimated sugar production
139. H.R. 3101, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 7186-89 (1987).
140. Legislation To Expand Trade Preferences ForCBI Beneficiaries IntroducedIn House, 4 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1007 (Aug. 12, 1987).
141. CBI Bill Would Make U.S. More Competitive, CaribbeanLeaders Tell Press Conference, 4 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1219 (Oct. 7, 1987).
142. Caribbean Basin Representatives Generally Endorse CBI 11 Legislation As HearingsStart, 4 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1557 (Dec. 16, 1987).
143. See supra notes 73 & 75-78.
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figures for the 1987/1988 crop year are 7.3 million tons, which is a six percent
increase from the preceding year. 14 U.S. raw sugar prices rose to 22.1 cents
in February, 1988, as compared to an average of 21.8 cents in 1987.145 The
world price for sugar was approximately 8.5 cents in March, 1988.146
The increase in sugar productivity is oddly accompanied by severe quota allocation reductions for 1988. The total quota allocations for twelve Caribbean
Basin countries in 1983 was almost four times greater than 1988 quota allocations for the same countries. 47 The Food Security Act of 1985 requires that
the President use all available authorities to enable the Secretary of Agriculture
to operate the sugar program at no cost to the Federal government. 14 8 Therefore, although the U.S. domestic sugar industry is prospering, quota reductions
continue to be made in order to prevent the accumulation of sugar by the Com49
modity Credit Corporation. 1
The U.S. sugar support system not only maintains the domestic sugar market
but also provides protection and expansion of the HFCS market, which is sugar's
major competitor. Corn sweeteners accounted for fifty-two percent of total U.S.
caloric sweetener consumption in 1987, marking a twelve percent rise since
the early 1980s. 110 Current statistics indicate that liquid HFCS has achieved
maximum market penetration against sugar and that the growth rate of the HFCS
market is slowing. 51 Another rising competitor in the U.S. sweetener market
is low-calorie sweeteners, which comprised twelve percent of the U.S. market
in 1987. 152
Promoters of the Sugar Supply Stabilization Act ("Sugar Stabilization Act")
considered each of the preceding factors. 153 This program attempts to reduce
the sugar support price over a four-year period in an attempt to move the U.S.
government away from a posture of guaranteeing the maintenance of inefficient producers and toward a discipline of providing for the maintenance of
the efficient producers. 15 4 The key is to allow market forces, not the govern-

144. ECONoMic
OUTLOOK REPORT

RESEARCH SERVICE,

U.S.

DEP'T OF AGRIC., SUGAR AND SWEETENERS SITUATION AND

3 (1988).

145. Id. at 6.
146. Id.
147. Calculations were derived from U.S. sugar import quota charts located in ECONOMIC RESEARCH
SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SUGAR AND SWEETENERS SITUATION AND OUTLOOK REPORT 13 (1988),
ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T. OF AGRIC., SUGAR AND SWEETENER SITUATION AND OUTLOOK
YEARBOOK 31 (1986).
148. ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SUGAR AND SWEETENERS SITUATION AND
OUTLOOK REPORT 22 (1988).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 17.
151. Id. The HFCS growth rate for 1986-87 was four and six-tenths percent as compared to an annual
average growth rate of twenty percent between 1981-85. Id.
152. Id. at 18.
153. ANNUAL AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK CONFERENCE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., OUTLOOK '88 43 (Dec.
2, 1987).
154. Id.
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ment, to determine the mix of sweeteners. The substitution of other sweeteners
and the expansion of domestic sugar production are blamed for the reduction
of sugar imports. 155 Proponents of the Sugar Stabilization Act argue that production controls and marketing quotas ultimately encourage inefficiency. 156 The
four-year sugar stabilizing plan includes a reduction in the loan rate to twelve
cents over the next four years, which would reduce the sugar price support level
from 21.5 cents to 15.5 cents. 15 7 At this level, it is argued, the government
would be providing a "safety net" for efficient producers rather than guarantee158
ing the profitability of inefficient ones.
Even with the severe decline in U.S. sugar imports, Caribbean nations have
not lost hope in their struggle to diversify and stabilize their economies. This
positive attitude is demonstrated through the Caribbean nations' willingness to
participate in impact studies to improve CBI and also in their attempts to diversify. A novel approach recently announced by St. Kitts includes a "diversification into sugar plan" including a fertilizer plant, ethanol plant and liquor distillery
using local cane sugar. 159
B. Proposal
The current CBI II proposal would return sugar quota levels to those existing
in 1984. This action is desperately and immediately needed. A long-range plan,
however, must be devised to encourage Caribbean nations to diversify away
from sugar and to achieve economic stability. This approach must be long term
to allow a sufficient transition period for Caribbean economies which are presently based almost entirely on sugar. Also, the U.S. should not allow the Caribbean
nations to become dependent on a U.S. sugar market that is declining because
of HFCS and low-calorie sweeteners.
An immediate return to 1984 sugar quota levels should be coupled with a
ten-year plan designed to reduce these initial quota levels by ten percent each
year. This initial step would restore foreign exchange receipts which are desperately needed by the Caribbean nations and would fund a gradual diversification
into nontraditional markets. This basic plan is attractive because it allows the
Caribbean nations time to adjust. The program is equally appealing from the
perspectives of U.S. sugar producers because it encompasses an eventual absence of Caribbean competition in the U.S. sugar market. Even more critical

155. Id. at 44.
156. Id. at 47.
157. Id.
158. Id. One of the major concerns of the proponents of the Sugar Stabilization Act is the ten-fold increase in Russian imports from Central America, excluding Nicaragua, between 1981 and 1986. As U.S.
imports continue to decline, Russian influence will continue to expand, establishing strong trading ties. Id.
at 51. But see Id. at 53, 54. "I recall that the U.S. was buying nearly all of Cuba's sugar at a premium when
Fidel Castro took over and it didn't save Cuba from going communist" Id.
159. Telephone interview with Tom Klotzbach, International Trade Specialist for St. Kitts (Apr. 4, 1988).
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is the fact that the proposed reductions are predictable rather than sporadic,
allowing the Basin countries time and an incentive to prepare. The U.S. should
also provide assistance through programs designed to instruct the Basin countries on U.S. marketing and production techniques to enable these countries
to develop competitive postures in the U.S. markets. A direct communication
line designed to promptly entertain any inquiries concerning U.S. market practices or procedures should be maintained between Caribbean nations and U.S.
markets. The list of articles which are currently ineligible to receive CBI dutyfree treatment should be extensively reviewed. Articles on the list which are
not produced in the U.S. or which are in short supply should be reassessed.
If investigations reveal that duty-free treatment of such articles would be beneficial
to Caribbean economies, these articles should be transferred to the CBI eligible articles list. This procedure should be monitored by a mechanism designed
to suspend such duty-free treatment if injury to a U.S. domestic economy develops. Finally, annual reviews should be conducted to evaluate and encourage
diversification attempts.
Such a long-range program, including an immediate return to 1984 sugar quota
levels with consistent gradual reductions of such quota levels accompanied by
instructions in U.S. marketing techniques and expansion of CB1 duty-free product
coverage, would provide the balance necessary to achieve diversification and
stability in Caribbean economies and would result in no injury to the U.S. domestic sugar market. The program must focus on a gradual transition from the
production of traditional products to the production of increasingly attractive
nontraditional products.
It is critical that the United States assist the Caribbean nations. With U.S.
assistance, the economies of these countries can be strengthened through diversification. The present CBI program is a beginning, but it must be modified
to restore and maintain strong relations-with the Caribbean nations who are of
such close proximity to the United States.
Betty Ruth Fox

